HISTORY OF FORT A. P. HILL

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AMBROSE P. HILL
PROLOGUE

What you are about to read is a condensation of the research and writing of primarily two individuals: Richard C. Payne, Ph.D, and Theo M. Boland. It documents how the reservation came into being and why; the contributions made during the Second World; and some of what's been happening since, but briefly. It is also a celebration of Fort A. F. Hill's 50th birthday. I hope you enjoy it.

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TRAINING FOR MOBILIZATION
Fort A. P. Hill During World War II

I. Creation of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation.

A. American Military Planning in 1940.

In the years following World War I, the War Plans Division of the American General Staff produced the "Rainbow Plans" which countered various contingencies. But, in the summer of 1940, American military planners were confronted with a worst case scenario: the virtual certainty of war breaking out simultaneously in two theaters on opposite sides of the globe. And, to make matters appear worse, the United States could only field an army of 280,000 poorly trained and badly equipped soldiers against the veterans of the massive Axis armies. To mobilize an effective, modern army was certain to require more time than would be available after the outbreak of hostilities.

By the spring of 1940 the War Plans Division had developed "RAINBOW-4" or the plan to raise a national army of four million men to conduct simultaneous operations in the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters. Crucial to the success of this plan was the ability of the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) to buy sufficient time for such a massive build-up. The PMP would use the existing force structure of ten Regular Army and eighteen National Guard divisions to provide a defensive shield while new units were formed. Therefore, the central assumption of the PMP was that the elements of the existing force structure would be fully prepared to fulfill their roles in the immediate defense of the continental United States (CONUS). This assumption, the crucial role of the PMP, and the deteriorating international situation brought the PMP under intense scrutiny.

As the PMP scrutiny increased, two major problem areas became evident to military planners. First, the National Guard was poorly trained and in a low state of readiness for its mobilization mission. Second, the mobilization station list contained in the PMP was inadequate to meet the needs of defending CONUS. These two problems are the initial links in the chain of events that led to the creation of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation.

On May 31, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the Congress for authority to call the National Guard into service for one calendar year without the start of hostilities against the United States. Although passage of this National Guard resolution and the subsequent Selective Service Act was delayed until August and September, respectively, their introduction in Congress caused frantic planning by the General Staff. Soon after the President's request, the G4 instructed the Quartermaster General to prepare cost estimates for new, semi-permanent housing for 1.2 million men who were likely to remain at their mobilization stations for at least a year. On July 11, 1940, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, instructed the G3 to revise the mobilization station list while taking into account the need for housing and training areas for all existing divisions and the distribution of
these divisions to provide the strategic defense of CONUS. An important
guideline from Marshall to the G3 was to select divisional mobilization
stations on land currently used as military reservations or owned by the
Federal or State governments. This was to prevent the delay of construction
by land acquisition and/or condemnation proceedings. The revised station list
was submitted to Marshall on July 30th and he directed the G3 and G4 to
prepare a coordinated time table for inducting the National Guard into Federal
Service based upon completion times for the new cantonments.

B. Executing the Protective Mobilization Plan.

The responsibility for executing the PMP was divided between two
parallel chains of command reflecting the War Department's traditional
insistence upon separating the routine conduct of administration and logistics
from the operational command of the Army in the field. So, for purposes of
routine business, CONUS was divided into nine zones of the interior, called
Corps Areas, which answered directly to the War Department and exercised
peacetime command and control over Regular Army units in their zones. The
Corps Area Commander was responsible for the posts, camps and stations in his
assigned geographic region as well as overseeing Quartermaster Corps and Corps
of Engineers activities affecting his area. Upon mobilization, operational
command of ground forces was assumed by the commanding generals of the four
numbered continental armies. Incidentally, the army commanders were corps
area commanders in peacetime.

Commanding the First Army in the summer of 1940 was Lieutenant General
(LTG) Hugh Drum, the senior general officer than on active duty. From his
headquarters on Governor's Island, New York, he exercised operational command
of ground forces in the northeastern United States. Within the First Army
area of operations lay the Third Corps Area. Major General (MG) Walter S.
Grant assumed command of this area on October 9, 1940, with headquarters at
Baltimore Maryland. MG Grant presided over the frantic preparation for
implementation of the PMP in an area comprising Virginia, West Virginia,
Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania. Although these two generals
had a lengthy association during their careers, their relationship as Army
and Corps Area commanders was a curious one. There was no direct Command
link, but their responsibilities in regards to the PMP were closely
interrelated which necessitated frequent consultation. LTG Drum was charged
with the training and operational readiness of the Regular Army and National
Guard divisions in the First Army area. MG Grant was responsible for the
cantonment construction and facility improvements in his corps area required
by the new mobilization station list. Therefore, was much like a client-agent
with the Corps Area Commander providing housing for soon-to-be-mobilized
troops and such training facilities as the Army Commander deems necessary. In
this particular relationship, LTG Drum and MG Grant would become principal
actors in the establishment of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation, as the
need for such a facility for First Army's National Guard divisions
became apparent.
The revised mobilization station list for the PMP placed three National Guard divisions in the Third Corps Area: the 44th Division at Fort Dix, New Jersey; the 28th Division at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania; and the 29th Division at Fort Meade, Maryland. This distribution was well considered for the strategic deployment of units within the Third Corps Area and conformed to General Marshall's guidance to place the National Guard divisions on land currently owned by the Federal or State governments. However, from the standpoint of training facilities available, all three stations left something to be desired. In the haste with which the revised station list was assembled during the last three weeks of July, the War Department delegated the actual inspection of the proposed divisional cantonments to the Corps Area Commanders. These inspections were generally so hasty and cursory that they provoked an investigation by a Senate Select Committee chaired by Harry S. Truman.

The stationing of the 29th Division was especially problematic. The decision by the G3 himself to move the division from Sabine River, Louisiana, to Fort Meade, Maryland, was apparently because of pressure to provide strategic defense for the nation's capital. From looking at a map, Fort Meade seemed an inspired choice, but it comprised only 7,500 acres and it lay in the Baltimore-Washington corridor where real estate prices made expansion prohibitive. However, there is no evidence in the Third Corps Area files to suggest that Fort Meade was ever seriously considered as a divisional cantonment site during the frantic revision of the PMP station list.

C. Searching for an Artillery Range.

On July 23, 1940, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Phillip Thurber, a staff officer at the Service Command School in Baltimore, wrote to the Third Corps Area G3 in "reference the project to locate a military reservation which should have an area content of approximately 60,000 acres of land, suitable for a garrison area of some 500 acres and a adjacent firing and maneuver area..." and stating that, besides the reconnaissance of Fort Lee and Fort Rustis, "there was a remaining project to locate a similar area, independent of any post somewhere in the territory between the Potomac River and upper Chesapeake Bay, such area to be on suitable soil suitably drained, adjacent to road, rail and water communication and having the possibility of installation of suitable utilities." LTC Thurber's report showed that acquiring land adjacent to Fort Lee (Petersburg, Virginia) and Fort Rustis (Newport News, Virginia) was not practical. He further stated that the remaining project would be regarded as confidential and receive his personal attention. But, this memorandum does not shed any light on what was intended by an area "independent of any post." Was it to be independent of any existing post and therefore a cantonment site for divisions to be mobilized at a later date, or was it to be a training area independent of any cantonment site? The answer is probably unknown to history, but the seed that would become A. P. Hill Military Reservation was planted and it would grow considerably in the late summer and fall of 1940.
On October 17, 1940, First Army asked Third Corps Area to provide a detailed accounting of firing range facilities for the 28th Division at Indiantown Gap and the 29th Division at Fort Meade. On October 22nd, Third Corps Area responded that the range facilities for the 28th Division were barely adequate and for the 29th Division they were completely unsatisfactory. Third Corps Area concluded that "in addition to the restrictions of firing... (i.e. limited small arms ranges, heavy weapons and artillery firing only one day per week at Edgewood Arsenal and no suitable area for artillery units to deploy tactically)... for the 29th Division, the reservation at Fort Meade is to small and will be to much further reduced by necessary camping space for the division and for the various zone of the interior installations to be located there as to provide insufficient maneuver space for any but small units."

On October 29th, LTG Drum, at the personal request of MG Grant, inspected the Fort Meade facilities. Then, on November 5th, Grant wrote a personal letter to Drum to follow up on discussions presumably held during the inspection visit. In this letter appears the first reference to the site of the A.P. Hill Military Reservation:

"We shall still be without facilities (at Fort Meade) for anti-aircraft practice and 37mm gun practice. A satisfactory artillery range cannot be obtained with the acquisition of (additional land adjacent to Fort Meade). No other suitable site, except the one south of the Rappahannock and southeast of Fredericksburg, in Virginia, previously mentioned in my conversation with you, has yet been determined."

Exactly who first suggested Caroline County, Virginia, as a site for heavy weapons and maneuver training facilities is uncertain, but the site selection likely evolved from continued staff work such as LTC Thurber's in July. What is known is that LTC Oliver Marston, an artillery officer stationed in Richmond and acting as an agent of the Third Corps Area commander, made a detailed investigation of the Bowling Green area on September 30, 1940. He enthusiastically recommended on October 9th that the War Department procure the Caroline County site. This coincided, incidentally, with MG Grant's assumption of Third Corps Area command.

D. Grant Suggests Caroline County.

Exactly when MG Grant became personally aware of LTC Marston's report is not known, but he evidently mentioned it to LTG Drum during the inspection of Fort Meade on October 29th. Grant's letter to Drum on November 5th was followed by a series of actions which resulted in the relatively rapid endorsement of Marston's recommendation. On November 15th he wrote to Drum to arrange a joint inspection of the Caroline County site by their respective staffs. Four days later this inspection took place and the report rendered to Drum on November 24th... recommended that the Federal Government acquire by the quickest practicable means approximately 160 square miles of Caroline
County, Virginia, within the following roughly designated boundaries: Spotsylvania-Caroline County boundary to Rappahannock River; along Rappahannock River (omitting Port Royal) to junction of Peumsend Creek just north of Pin Hook; thence south along road through Pin Hook, Plainview, White's Mill to Alps; then west and northwest through Sparta to Milford (exclusive); thence northwest along Mattaponi River and its tributary, Ny River, to the Spotsylvania-Caroline border. Border towns, such as Milford, Bowling Green, Woodford, and Guinea could be omitted, but the rail facilities in these towns should be available to the troops.

Without waiting for Drum's written concurrence, Grant formally requested on November 23rd that the War Department acquire the Caroline County land. On December 12th, the War Department returned the request for clarification of certain points. Specifically, they wanted whether any suitable government-owned land had been considered; whether the area requested could be reduced; and whether LTC Marston's cost estimate was not overly optimistic. Grant replied on December 31st, satisfactorily answering the War Department concerns, and clarifying the major purposes the area was intended to serve:

"a. To provide an area for Corps maneuvers for the II Corps and an area for division maneuvers of the divisions of the II Corps, which shall not be subject to the restrictions and artificialities which are imposed on units attempting training exercises and maneuvers in areas cut up by patches of land over which troops are not permitted to pass...."

"b. It is intended to establish in the area, if acquired, the service practice range for the artillery of the 29th Division, stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. This range would of course be available also for the other divisions of the II Corps."

"c. If this land is acquired it is intended to keep it as nearly constantly in use throughout the year as training conditions imposed on the First Army by General Headquarters will permit. It is hoped later to establish base camps for two divisions at nearly opposite corners of the area and so far as conditions permit to have at least one division of the Corps always in the Field."

Apparantly convinced by the weight of argument, The War Department agreed one week later. On January 6, 1941, an internal War Department memo sent to the C4 with a listing of recommended items for inclusion in the land acquisition portion of the Fourth Supplemental Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1941. Included on that list was a Fredericksburg site of 109,440 acres to be purchased at an estimated cost of $1,650,000. The memo was approved and the request submitted to Congress. The bill was cast for a confrontation with the citizens of Caroline County.
II. Public Opposition in Caroline County.

A. The Public Relations Battle.

The Army had conducted its staffing and field investigation with great discretion, keeping the citizens of Caroline County totally unaware of the impending acquisition. Northeastern Caroline County attracted the attention of military planners because of its sparse population and relatively low economic level. They were genuinely concerned that military necessities be met with minimal disruption to the civilian economy. But the citizens of Caroline County were fiercely proud of their Virginian heritage and the community was remarkably close-knit. Many families had lived in the area since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Given the above facts and the American Tradition to be suspicious of anything military, announcing the acquisition to the local community required diplomatic handling, which the War Department might have proved capable of doing, if it had been allowed to try. The chief culprit for the botched public relations was Representative S. Otis Bland who leaked to the Richmond Times-Dispatch the fact that the appropriations bill before the Congress contained a request to purchase a large tract of land in Virginia to be used as a military reservation. Neither this newspaper account nor the one to follow carried a precise location for this reservation or when the land was to be acquired, except that it would be soon. This information, or lack thereof, created an atmosphere for the starting of wildly conflicting rumors and speculations which the War Department could not counter because, by law and regulation, it was bound to not make a public statement whatsoever until Congress had passed the appropriation. So, for the first three weeks of March, 1941, the War Department was unable to present its case in order to defend itself against the furor in the local community.

To add to the confusion, on February 28th, Representative T. G. Burch of southside Virginia district had sent a telegram to General Marshall and MG Grant requesting the War Department not make final decision on site selection until it had considered "the ideal site located in Pittsylvania County." The Danville, Virginia, Chamber of Commerce also wired Grant with the same request. When Grant resisted, Burch persisted, writing again on March 7th and enclosing an article from the Richmond Times-Dispatch describing the mounting resistance Caroline County (Congressman Bland had met with a group of Caroline citizens on March 5th and informed them that the War Department would announce its intention to locate the camp in their county as soon as the money was provided). The idea of relocating the maneuver area to Pittsylvania County was never more than foolish fancy. The selection of the Caroline site had been thoroughly staffed it was clearly the militarily correct decision. Any attempt to second guess it at this point was likely to create more problems than it solved. And it did create problems. By the time Grant discarded the Pittsylvania site, on March 20th, his brief consideration of it had already damaged further the battered public relations between the Army and the
Caroline inhabitants by providing ammunition to his opponents and by making him and his staff hesitate when it was essential for them to stick to their guns.

The timing of Grant's hesitation was particularly bad since President Roosevelt signed the appropriations bill into law on March 17th, which empowered Grant to proceed with the land acquisition and to make public statements about it. Yet, the first public statements contained gross indiscretions that fueled the controversy. On March 20th, the Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star quoted LTC Theodore Arter, the Third Corps Area public relations officer, as saying "the Army has no desire to go where it is not welcome. The Army prefers the Caroline site in preference to others considered and desires to establish the camp there, but is not disposed at present to take over the area against the wishes of the people." This represented actual policy as evidenced by internal War Department documents. MG Grant had ordered the Real Estate Branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General to suspend all acquisition actions on March 19th, the day after he met with a delegation of Caroline civic leaders. On March 20th, after discarding the Pittsylvania proposition, Grant wrote a personal letter to LTG Drum and despaired of finding any solution to the problem, concluding with this suggestion:

"It might be a good plan, if worst comes to worst, to give the Governor and the State Planning Board the specification of the kind of training area desired, let them dig it up for us, and let them handle the attendant protests and local antagonisms."

But, the one person who never had any second thoughts about the Caroline County location was LTG Drum. With his focus clearly on the military necessity for this particular maneuver area and being relatively insulated from the storm of protest, he was in no mood to change his mind, and he was not about to let this direly needed training facility slip from his grip. With a crafty subtlety gleaned from forty years experience in Army politics, Drum moved to shore up Grant and to salvage the public relations situation.

B. LTG Drum's Change in Strategy.

An abrupt change in policy towards the Caroline site occurred after March 20th. Grant's original strategy was to use reason on the public, but it was clearly inappropriate to defeat organized opposition. A more cynical approach emerged after March 20th that took a stern and inflexible public posture while indulging in covert "horse trading" as necessary to satisfy the special interests of the opposition's more influential members. Grant himself suggested the point of attack in a letter to Drum in which he described the two main reasons for the protests as being "the tract embraces too large a part of Caroline and its loss...would seriously affect the tax receipts..."and"...the matter of the historic homes, some of which are now lived in by descendants of the old families."
In light of this intelligence, the response was simply to redraw the boundaries to reduce the area and exclude the historic homes and other particularly valuable property. So, Grant wrote to Mr. Bernard Mahon, Commonwealth Attorney for Caroline County, on March 21st requesting that a follow-up meeting with Caroline citizens be postponed because "before the meeting, we should like to see what we can do in changing the proposed boundaries." The meeting then took place on March 27th in Bowling Green. Eleven hand-picked representatives of Caroline County met an impressive array of "brass" from the War Department: MG H. C. Pratt, commanding general of the 11th Army Corps; and Colonel Marion Howze, First Army G4 and personal representative of LTG Drum.

Detailed accounts of this three-hour meeting appeared in the Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star on March 27th and the Caroline Progress on April 3rd. According to the accounts, MG Grant gave a speech depicting the dire military necessity that impelled the War Department to acquire the Caroline tract. He then displayed a map showing the dramatic reductions in the desired area with the exclusion of any tracts containing historic homes. MG Pratt then gave a detailed account of how the area would be used. Finally, COL Howze recounted the history of the search for a suitable First Army Maneuver Area, including the reasons why the Pittsylvania site had been rejected. He made the sensible observation that, although the War Department sympathized with the plight of those about to be dispossessed, "an attempt to establish a camp in any area of the east would bring up the same problems that confront the Army in Caroline." The meeting concluded with an appeal to patriotism by MG Grant, who reminded the citizens present "the world is at war... These homes may not be saved unless we get some place to train these troops."

C. The Opposition Gives In.

In the face of such a carefully orchestrated performance, the organized opposition to the Caroline military reservation quickly collapsed. LTG Drum not only carried the day, but made himself the adjudicator of disputes over the exclusion of valuable properties and, thus, a hero in the eyes of the local citizenry. On April 3rd, Drum sent a personal letter to Grant formalizing the revised boundaries of the maneuver area. Disputes over property exclusions continued for some time and the boundaries were not finalized for another year.

On March 29, 1941, MG Grant released the following statement to the press:

"On account of the imperative need of an artillery range and training area by the First Army in the general locality of eastern Virginia, and on account of the fact that the Caroline County tract meets the Army needs far better than other tentative areas considered, it is announced that after
again considering the matter, the First Army will continue with its plans to acquire the Caroline County tract, with the boundaries as already proposed subject to slight modifications to be decided at an early date."

"This action is taken only on account of the pressing demands of suitable national defense, and is a matter of profound regret and concern."

D. Naming the Reservation.

Now that the decision had been made to acquire the Caroline maneuver area, a name needed to be selected. On March 31st, the Historical Section of the Army War College was asked to suggest three possible names. On April 2nd, retired Colonel Oliver Spaulding, the chief of the Historical Section, sent a memorandum to the G3 with the suggested names: McAndrew, Hill and Morgan. Accompanying the memo was a copy of the article on Ambrose Powell Hill contained in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Three weeks later, the G3 sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff recommending that the name "A. P. Hill Military Reservation" be used for the Caroline site. The G4 concurred on May 1st and the Chief of Staff approved the recommendation on May 5th. War Department General Order Number 5 was published June 11, 1941, officially designating the First Army Maneuver Area as the A. P. Hill Military Reservation.

What is curious about this procedure is that the question seems to have been resolved purely within the War Department. A logical inference is that the War Department wished to resolve the matter quickly, with as little public visibility as possible, given the state of public relations on the whole issue. From this perspective, it is hard to fault the G3's procedure or choice. By memorializing Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill, the great artilleryman and hero of the Army of Northern Virginia, the War Department appealed to a vein of patriotism which no self-respecting Virginian would be without. Indeed, it is probably the only decision which did not arouse controversy in the local community.

III. Acquiring the Land for the A. P. Hill Military Reservation.

A. Procurement and Construction Begins.

With public opposition calmed, LTG Drum gave MG Grant instructions to begin the immediate acquisition of land. In a letter to Grant dated April 3, 1941, Drum delineated an area of approximately 70,000 acres for which an immediate military necessity existed. He also established a timetable for the procurement of land and set priorities for particular tracts. Using the path of Route 301 as the dividing line, Drum instructed that the northern portion should be made available for maneuvers by June 1st and the southern portion, to be used for artillery practice ranges, by September 1st. This emphasis on the maneuver aspects of the new reservation, despite the inadequate range
facilities at Fort Meade, was to have considerable impact on the pre-war
history of the training area.

Drum's request that Grant procure 42,000 acres of land in less than
two months' time caused the Third Corps Area commander to protest against his
superior's wishes. In a dictated telephone message on April 4th, Grant gives
his opinion that "it will require an exodus of hundreds of people within less
than sixty days, and I don't think the present situation will stand it..."
Drum replied the following day that "While the training of II Corps troops
requires an area early in June large enough for (regimental) combat team
training, I do not expect the whole of the June area to be available at that
time... If you think changing the word 'before' June first to 'from' will
clarify the views expressed, I am willing and so authorize with and
understanding that this will not block securing adequate area for combat team
training in June."

Armed with this clarification, Grant wrote a letter of instruction on
April 7th to Brigadier General (BG) Brehan Somervell, Assistant Quartermaster
General. On April 9th, BG Somervell appointed LTC R. G. Moses as liaison
officer between the commanding general of II Corps and the Office of the
Quartermaster General. Somervell empowered Moses to make adjustments
regarding minor boundary questions. Moses would also furnish a map to
Somervell indicating camp sites selected by the II Corps. The land for these
camps would be acquired first; after which, acquisition would proceed from
north to south in order to provide a suitable training area at the earliest
practicable date. Other arrangements made by Somervell were spelled out in
the official War Department press of April 12th. Sensitive to the issue of
displaced persons, the War Department announced that "comprehensive plans for
the resettlement and rehabilitation" of the approximately 4,700 affected
persons had been made. These plans included establishing a Bowling Green
office to "act as clearinghouse for those seeking new locations in the general
vicinity of the site;" providing assistance from the Farm Security
Administration and the Federal Land Bank; and determining prices to be paid by
"a fair and complete appraisal of the value of the land and its improvements"
made by "government and local appraisers under the direction of the Soil
Conservation Service of the U. S. Department of Agriculture."

On May 15, 1941, four hundred and thirty acres of land within the
"June 1 area" were actually acquired and the first troops from the Fifth
Engineer Regiment of Fort Belvoir arrived. These engineer soldiers would
prepare a campsite for 18,000 troops at a location north of Route 17 in the
vicinity of Rappahannock Academy. The Caroline Progress for May 29th reported
1,100 engineers laboring feverishly on "three sites, one near Mount Creek just
off Highway 17, a second on Route 614 back of Rappahannock Academy, and a
third on Route 607 near Moss Neck." The pace of the activity was undoubtedly
inspired by the knowledge that the troops to occupy these campsites would
arrive in seven days. On June 3rd, LTC John McLaurine arrived on special
orders to activate the 1336th Service Unit, the station complement for the
reservation. Headquarters were established in the recently vacated Mica High
School.
B. Money Runs Short and Anxiety Runs High.

All the elements of LTC Drum's ambitious timetable were falling into place, but trouble was brewing. As agents of the Quartermaster General completed the taking of options on the "June 1 area", it became evident that the War Department's skepticism about LTC Marston's estimate of real estate prices in Caroline County had been well founded. The first alarm came from a conference held by MG Pratt, the II Corps commander, to take stock of expenditures for the "June 1 area" and to project additional costs. Pratt reported to Drum on July 2nd that "...there will remain about $380,000 to purchase additional areas south of the Port Royal-Bowling Green Road (Route 301)." In this report Pratt also raised the possibility that the "September 1 area" boundaries might be altered in accord with the funds remaining for its purchase. On July 3rd, the Caroline Progress reported that the acquisition of the "June 1 area" was now complete and that appraisals were proceeding in the "September 1 area". However, it also stated that due to a shortage of funds, plans for purchase of the "September 1 area" appears uncertain and emphasized this aspect of the article by headlining it "ARMY AREA BOUNDARY CHANGES SEEN POSSIBLE."

C. LTC Drum and Public Relations (Again).

The furor touched off in the local community by this news was reminiscent of early March, and once again it fell to the tenacious Drum to soothe an outraged public. He continued the appraisal of the "September 1 area" and had a detailed survey made of it in order to lay out artillery ranges. This impressed upon the local populace the Army's intention to buy and use this area. Then, Drum visited the A.P. Hill Military Reservation on July 7th and granted an interview to the Caroline Progress in which he praised the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the Caroline Countians. Drum was quoted to the effect that more funds "unquestionably would be needed" to complete the purchase. This visit had a very steadying effect as Drum adroitly combined fact-finding with a reaffirmation of policy and public relations. It bore fruit within a few weeks. The July 17th issue of the Caroline Progress carried an article in which the farmers of the "September 1 area" were given sensible advice to continue their work as usual until the War Department announced a decision on the reservation boundaries.

That decision came within a week as the July 24th issue of the Caroline Progress reported that Mr. Donahue of the Soil Conservation Service, and under whose direction the land was being purchased, had returned from a conference in Washington with news that the War Department would definitely acquire the entire 70,000 acres as originally announced. Appraisals were expected to be completed by August 15th, but no options could be taken until Congress approved sufficient funds for purchase of the entire tract. County Agent C. B. Landford was quoted as advising farmers to continue normal operations, especially since permission to harvest crops in the area had been requested.

On August 9, 1941 the War Department directed the quartermaster General to include in his next appropriations estimate an item for $1,206,000 to acquire the remaining lands of the "September 1 area." The War Department also reduced the eventual acreage for the A. P. Hill Military Reservation from 110,000 acres to approximately 30,071 acres. Presumably, this was the result of the land appraisals conducted in the "September 1 area." But, at this point, the matter of additional funds seemed to languish. In reality, there was a great deal of under-the-table trading concerning boundary adjustments in the area still to be acquired.

The House Appropriations Committee did not begin consideration of the additional funds needed to purchase the remaining 38,728 acres until November with its report to the full Congress coming in early December. Progress seemed positively glacial when the events of December 7, 1941 galvanized the Congress into action. The Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1942 was approved by Congress on December 17th. The Caroline Progress reported on Christmas Day, 1941, that "optioning of land in the adjusted "September 1 area" would begin December 29th. Then, on January 15, 1942, the Progress carried notice that "possession of the 'September 1 area' or extension of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation will be required by February 15, even if condemnation of tracts becomes necessary." Government possession of the adjusted area, in which the artillery range was to be constructed, was recorded in the Caroline County Clerk's office on February 5, 1942; the final tract was recorded May 4, 1942. (The "June 1 area" had been recorded on July 14, 1941.)

E. The Economic Impact on Caroline County.

Because the acquisition of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation and the subsequent evacuation of families were such emotionally charged issues, it is appropriate at this time to attempt some objective assessment of the impact upon the civilian community. In 1940, the Norfolk District of the Corps of Engineers prepared a study of this impact. According to this study, "there were 534 families displaced, comprising 2,319 inhabitants, of which 1,319 were white and 1,004 were Negroes. Of the total number of families displaced 68% were home owners and...approximately 25% of all displaced persons moved outside the county." The study went on to note that 75% of the land purchased was classed as woodland area and fully half of the total area "was made up of woodland tracts without improvements." The principal agricultural activity on the active farms scattered throughout the vast area was truck gardening, with sweet potatoes, watermelons, cantaloupes, tomatoes and cucumbers being the most important crops. Although ten schools were closed, and the county experienced the "loss of average daily attendance of 354 pupils", no new schools were required to absorb the remaining displaced students. In purely economical terms, the report concluded that the net loss to the county was $5,325.67 per annum in tax revenues, which was more than offset by $23,102.00 per annum saved by the Commonwealth of Virginia in road maintenance costs.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above facts is that LTC Harison, MG Grant, LTG Drum, and the others involved in the selection and ultimate purchase of the site that became A. P. Hill Military Reservation had done their work rather well. Literally hundreds of thousands of troops passed through this training area during World War II and the value of the reservation for training large units proved incalculable. That such training resource was acquired on the eve of the war with such a relatively small disruption of the civilian community is truly remarkable. Certainly LTG Drum, the "godfather of the A. P. Hill Military Reservation", must have felt gratified with the results.

IV. II Army Corps and the First Maneuvers.

A. Command and Control Relationships

In the summer of 1940, the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) was implemented for the purpose of expanding the Army to provide immediate defense of the continental United States. With the implementation of the PMP came the activation of tactical corps headquarters which were separate and apart from the corps areas. The tactical corps commanders were allocated resources from the numbered army commanders and were charged with the training of units assigned to them under the PMP. So long as the PMP remained in effect, the A. P. Hill Military Reservation was under the command and control of First U.S. Army, and, since there were no units permanently assigned to the facility, its use was scheduled by First Army for its own units. In practice, LTG Drum delegated this authority so that during the first eight months of its existence, the reservation was under the control of the II U.S. Corps headquarters which scheduled its subordinate units to use the facilities and supervised their training while there.

The II Corps was activated August 1, 1940, with headquarters established at Wilmington, Delaware. A station list, dated March 13, 1941, shows units as diverse as truck regiments, topographical engineer companies, signal battalions, aircraft observation squadrons and separate antitank and antiaircraft battalions. Quite a number of these units were sent to A. P. Hill Reservation to train. But, it was the three infantry divisions assigned to II Corps (28th, 29th & 44th) that were given priority for use of the training area.

B. Preparing for the Carolina Maneuvers.

For October and November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct the largest peacetime maneuver in its history with two entire corps opposing each other on land from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Fort Jackson, North Carolina. In order to hone the maneuver skills of the II Corps' divisions, they were to conduct division-level operations at the A. P. Hill Reservation as a tune-up for the Carolina Maneuvers. Since the acquisition of the "June 1 area" was progressing far better than expected, LTG Drum and MG Pratt decided to open the new installation with a "bang" by conducting an umpired large-
scale exercise in which the 44th Division "blue force" would be opposed by a "red force" consisting of the 60th Regimental Combat Team and the Third U.S. Cavalry, both Regular Army units. The spectacle of grown men indulging in war games seems to have been a source of amusement for the citizens of Caroline County, many of whom still remained in the "June 1 area" when at 1700 hours on Thursday, June 5, 1941, the exercise began. The June 12th edition of the Caroline Progress devoted a number of pages of bemused accounts of the proceedings. Although the exercise lasted only four days, it represented a publicity coup as the opening gambit for a controversial new facility.

C. Intensive Training.

After the opening extravaganza, which involved nearly 25,000 troops, training at the reservation settled into a pattern that continued throughout the summer and early fall of 1941. The remainder of June saw the 115th and 175th Infantry Regimental Combat Teams of the 29th Division come to Caroline for day and night maneuvers. The 29th Division would use the reservation until July 15th, when combat teams from the 44th Division returned for training, culminating in division-level maneuvers from August 1st through 15th. The 28th Division would occupy the facility and maneuver from August 28th until September 13th, after which the 29th Division returned for maneuvers under II Corps supervision. Additionally, all antitank units of the Corps assembled at the reservation for training from August 4th through the 23rd.

Staff officers of the II Corps were in constant attendance at the installation providing control and participating in command post exercises. When the corps headquarters was not established on the reservation, control of all training activities was vested in the senior tactical unit commander using the facilities.

Training for II Corps units proceeded as scheduled at a hectic and intensive pace, which reflected the deteriorating international situation. The last scheduled II Corps maneuver on A. P. Hill Military Reservation began September 13, 1941, as the 29th Division stopped enroute to the Carolina Maneuvers to engage in two weeks of division problems. On Thursday, September 25th, the dismounted elements of the division marched to the Milford railroad to entrain for movement to North Carolina, while the division's vehicles began the long road march to the maneuver area. An unusual silence descended upon the A. P. Hill Reservation, which had rarely had fewer than 5,000 troops in the field, and frequently more than 10,000, since the Army arrived in June.

While the Carolina Maneuvers were happening, plans for the future of A. P. Hill Military Reservation were uncertain. The appropriations bill which would provide for the purchase of the "September 1 area" was languishing in Congress. The 1335th Service Unit made preparations for winterizing their buildings and tents without knowing if the training maneuver units would resume in the spring. The problem was that the Carolina Maneuvers were the
culminating exercise of the FMF and no one in the War Department knew what the next step would be. The answer would come soon. Over two months after they had departed, the 29th Division arrived back at the reservation to bivouac enroute from the Carolina Maneuvers to Fort Meade. The date was December 7, 1941.

V. The War Years.

A. Transition to War.

The first wartime use of the reservation was a special school for junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) which was organized and administered by II Corps. On December 26, 1941 the War Department approved an expenditure of $27,000 "for the purpose of erecting a winterized tent camp for 1,800 men at A. P. Hill Military Reservation" in order to house this school, which would provide practical instruction on small unit leadership in the field. One officer and one NCO from each lettered infantry company in the Corps was to attend the school. In addition to the students, school troops to carry out demonstration problems were assigned from the 28th Division at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. They included one battalion of infantry, one battery of light field artillery, and one company of engineers. Interestingly, the school commandant was COL Manton J. Eddy, who nine months later would be a major general and commander of the 9th Infantry Division.

The II Corps had intended for the A. P. Hill leadership academy to be an ongoing school. Its first course was conducted January 15 to February 15, 1942. However, this first course was also the last course because II Corps was deployed to Camp Blanding, Florida, on February 17th and its divisions reassigned to other organizations. The shortlived leadership school constituted the final chapter in the maturing of the II Corps and its subordinate units through training at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation. But, it also provided a preview of things to come when the Caroline Progress printed a "public warning" that beginning on January 15, live ammunition will be fired within the "June 1st section" under the auspices of the II Corps school. There is no record of live firing being conducted before this time. This event symbolized the installation's transition from peace to war.

B. Army Ground Forces and the 29th Division.

When the II Corps passed from LTG Drum's command, he placed control of the A. P. Hill Reservation in the hands of VI Corps at Providence, Rhode Island, which continued to use the reservation as a kind of annex to Fort Meade for the field training of the 29th Division. Then, too, with the long-delayed acquisition of the "September 1 acres", the establishment of service-practice ranges for the 29th Division's artillery units became a reality. The April 30, 1942, edition of the Caroline Progress warned that the "attention of the public again is called to the dangers of entering the reservation, particularly the artillery range where live firing practice is underway." Thus began what was to become one of the most heavily used artillery ranges during World War II.
Meanwhile, the relationship between A. P. Hill Military Reservation and the 29th Division was to become more intimate still as an indirect result of the War Department's revised strategic blueprint (RAINBOW-5), which projected an 8 million man army of 100 divisions. At the outbreak of the war, 36 divisions had been organized and trained under the Protective Mobilization Plan. The major task of the newly formed Army Ground Forces (AGF) was to organize the remainder. But, as these "new" divisions were created and began training, the existing military installations in the United States bulged at the seams causing "old" divisions to be moved from their permanent stations to make room. A case in point was the 29th Division and its less than ideal home, Fort Meade.

Army Ground Forces planned to activate the 76th Division at Fort Meade, but LTC Drum protested that the installation was sufficient for only one division. He further insisted that the location of the 29th Division in the vicinity of Fort Meade was vital for strategic defense. Army Ground Forces decided that the 29th Division would have to go into the field at the A. P. Hill Reservation. The change of station was effected on May 20, 1942, at a time when the bulk of the division was already training at the site. Meanwhile, the War Department had removed VI Corps from LTC Drum's command and shifted it, with the 29th Division, to the direct control of Army Ground Forces. This shift had a considerable impact on the control of A. P. Hill Military Reservation. It was nominally an installation belonging to First Army, but the War Department had designated it as home station for a division reporting to AGF. Thus, LTC Drum found himself in the humiliating position of having to request permission from AGF to use the training area that he was responsible for creating.

C. The "Yankee Division" Arrives.

The 29th Division remained on the reservation, preparing for combat, until July 7, 1942, when it deployed to Camp Blanding. In the meantime, the War Department was planning to move another of the "old" divisions to the reservation. On June 17th, the War Department directed LTC Drum to move one combat team of the 26th Division to the Caroline training area as soon as practicable in order to make room for the expansion of the Engineer Amphibious Training Center at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts. Instead, Drum moved the entire division which officially closed on its new home July 9th. The arrival of the Massachusetts National Guard at a site not thirty miles from where their ancestors were slaughtered at the Fredericksburg Sunken Road seems to have amused the local residents. An article in the Caroline Progress of August 2nd wryly noted that "the very designation 'Yankee Division' and the 'YD' identification of these troops wear would not have harmonized then to soil consecrated by Jackson's men when sectional feeling was high." However, with sectional feeling magnanimously set aside, the 26th Division remained in intensive field training until October 10th, when it departed for Fort Jackson to prepare for overseas deployment.
D. Class II Installation Status.

In March 1942, the War Department had placed the Corps Areas under control of the newly formed Service of Supply (later renamed Army Service Forces). In July 1942, the War Department renamed the Corps Areas as Service Commands and defined their responsibilities, and those of their service units, for military installations of various types, which were categorized into "classes." On Class I installations, the principal activities were related to Services of Supply functions and were under the control of the Service Command commander with the commander of the station complement exercising full authority. However, Class II installations were those where AGF units were stationed and the authority of the Service Commands on such installations was confined to control of administration, housekeeping and supply functions. It was emphasized that the commanding general of a service command had no control over or responsibility for the AGF troops training on the post.

E. Wartime Post Commander.

Because the A. P. Hill Military Reservation was never designated as the home station of AGF units for any considerable period of time and because a number of activities unrelated to AGF were conducted on the reservation, the commander of the 138th Service Unit exercised somewhat more control than many of his counterparts at other Class II installations. In large measure, this was due to the personality and ability of the station complement's wartime commander, LTC Elmer F. Munshower. A Maryland National Guardsman mobilized with the 29th Division in February 1942, LTC Munshower's background prepared him well for the tasks at hand. He had been a rifle company commander in France during World War I and had risen to acting commander of a battalion in combat. Between the wars he had been elected mayor of Frederick, Maryland, and had served as Superintendent of the Maryland State Police. After its activation, the 29th Division's commander had personally picked him to supervise small arms training, and he was actively involved in other aspects of post-mobilization training. He would have served with distinction in his second war except he was nearly fifty-seven years old in December 1941, and, like most overaged National Guard officers, he was transferred to a service unit before his division was deployed.

On December 30, 1941, which was ten days after he assumed command, LTC Munshower wrote to the Third Corps Area commander, who was now MG R. C. Platt. Something of Munshower's judgment, experience and energy can be gleaned from this letter in which he reports his observations and plans to his new boss:

"Some things have been a little complicated which have been brought about by lack of knowledge of anyone here as to what has been done and the work going on now. There has been no historical record of any kind kept here which is very important. In my opinion our headquarters should be notified when troops or detachments are to occupy the reservation, and as to their locations, also any work to be done."
Munshower not only made good on his plans to tighten up the 1336th Service Unit, but for three and one half years of intense utilization of the training area, he also performed a delicate balancing act of the often conflicting demands from his superiors, First Army, AFG, and the War Department. At the same time, he cultivated outstanding public relations with a civilian community which had previously been strongly opposed to the Army’s presence in Caroline County.

F. The Eastern Defense Command.

For a brief period, from November 1942 until February 1943, the A. P. Hill Military Reservation was used almost exclusively by LTG Drum's Eastern Defense Command (EDC), which was created in March 1942 to protect vital installations on the East Coast. One of the EDC's tactical units was the Mobile Force, Military District of Washington, which guarded sensitive installations in the capital area. In May 1942, the 176th Infantry Regiment of the Virginia National Guard was assigned to the Mobile Force and, in the autumn, began rotating its battalions to the reservation to conduct field training and to complete the Army Ground Forces Combat Test. Elements of the 176th Regiment were in the training area continuously from October 1942 until February 1943. On February 20th, the entire regiment moved to the reservation to conduct large scale maneuvers until April 10th when it moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, for assignment to the Infantry School.

Other EDC units using the reservation during this time were mobile antiaircraft artillery units whose training was described in a letter to LTG Drum from the commanding general of EDC's Antiaircraft Artillery Command, dated December 14, 1942:

"Two regiments of antiaircraft artillery and one brigade headquarters, antiaircraft, are now undergoing intensive field training at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation...All troops live in base camps under tentage drawn locally but spend the far greater proportion of their time in field bivouac in the course of training problems. The program has been progressive, starting with battery and battalion problems conducted by battalion commanders, with regimental problems, first conducted by regimental commanders and later by the brigade commander, followed by brigade problems utilizing all forces present and available."

The letter closed with a recommendation that more field training of this sort be conducted. But, LTG Drum's endorsement of this suggestion was not well received in the War Department. The winter of 1942-43 was the last time that Eastern Defense Command extensively used the A. P. Hill Reservation.

G. Productivity and the XIII Army Corps.

As America entered her second year of war, the mighty military
establishment created by General Marshall rolled along in high gear and A. P. Hill Military Reservation began its most productive and diversified period. Its contribution to the success of the American juggernaut in 1943 was primarily the continuation of its service as a maneuver area for the advanced tactical training of large units, while providing range facilities for artillery, armor, antitank and antiaircraft units. For 1943 and the first six months of 1944, XII Corps was designated as the principal using agency for the reservation. But, just prior to this AGF had brought the 36th Division of the Texas National Guard to the training area in the last week of February for Combat Training Tests just prior to overseas movement. The tests were successfully completed and the division departed March 13, 1943. By April 3rd it was in North Africa preparing for the landing at Salerno, Italy.

Even before the 36th Division departed, the first major influx of XII Corps units arrived. Between March 11th and the 18th, the following array of field artillery (FA) reported to LTC Munshower: 15th FA Observation Balloon Battalion; 71st FA Battalion; 186th FA Battalion; 187th FA Battalion; 953rd FA Battalion; 955th FA Battalion; 991st FA Battalion; 258th FA Group; 186th FA Group; and 187th FA Group. These units conducted extensive field training under the command of the 71st FA Brigade. The entire exercise was conducted by the Second Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, XII Corps, which arrived at the reservation on March 17th. Thus began a period of extremely heavy use by the XII Corps. The post recorded a daily average strength of 21,000 men for the month of March 1943. For the duration of 1943, XII Corps never had fewer than several thousand personnel in the field at the reservation.

The concentration of such large numbers of troops at a field maneuver site where facilities were deliberately kept to a minimum obviously posed a number of logistical problems for the 1336th Service Unit. The Carolina Progress on February 12, 1943, reported that the Bowling Green U.S.O. had contracted for an addition to house expanded shower facilities. The article noted that "shower facilities with hot and cold water are greatly in demand...in a field-maneuver area like A. P. Hill Military Reservation, where most of the troops are quartered in tents." It further remarked that 400 to 500 men frequently showed up in a single day to shower at the U.S.O. club. Even more interesting is the description of Post Exchange operations found in the December 16, 1943, edition of the paper:

"'It is an odd business, because of the way in which these tactical units fill up this place one week and depart another. We may have seven or eight "stores" one week and twenty-three next week,' said...the Field Exchange Officer for A. P. Hill. The 1336th Service Unit has an entire detachment which is devoted to setting up and operating these exchanges in pyramidal tents near the troops deployed over hill and dale."

In July 1943, the A. P. Hill Reservation became home station for another division evicted from its quarters as installations continued to
expand to meet the needs of mobilization. The latest tenant was the 76th Division, which left Fort Meade to make room for the AGF Replacement Training Center. Ironically, it was the 76th Division's activation that forced the 29th Division to move to the reservation. The division spent the summer of 1943 conducting advanced field training until it departed for Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, on October 3rd.

Throughout 1943, the ranges at the reservation were used by the Antiaircraft Replacement Training Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Although the AA RTC would no longer need this facility in early 1944, the XIII Corps would utilize the training area and ranges until the end of the war.

H. 1944 'Till War's End.

In 1944, the average daily strength on the reservation dropped to 3,459, but there was a variety of units in training. The installation was used extensively for the field training of Army Service Force (ASF; formerly Services of Supply) personnel from nearby training centers at Fort Belvoir and Camp Lee in Virginia and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The trainees were destined for assignment in the Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster Corps, or Ordnance Corps. Field training was also provided for officers and officer candidates from the Engineer and Quartermaster Schools. Developmental and test work was conducted by the Engineer and Quartermaster Boards.

In 1945, with the war winding down, A. P. Hill Military Reservation began to inherit training missions due to the closure of camps and expiration of leases on other maneuver areas. Field training, combat service training, and officer candidate training for the Chemical Warfare Service was shifted to the reservation since no other area suitable for the use of toxic chemicals and smoke generation was available. When Fort Story and Camp Pickett, both in Virginia, were converted to convalescent centers, the amount of antiaircraft machinegun firing and artillery range use increased on the installation. Because of this shifting of so much ASF training activities to this reservation, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, requested that A. P. Hill Military Reservation be designated a Class I installation for better coordination of ASF activities. However, the Army Ground Forces did not concur for the following reasons:

1. Maneuver areas and ranges at the reservation were required to afford adequate facilities for combat units at Camp Pickett which had somewhat limited maneuver areas and artillery ranges.

2. The reservation would afford a necessary training facility for troop units stationed in Washington and vicinity.

3. The reservation would be of great value for training National Guard personnel of the District of Columbia and adjacent areas. (In fact, it was contemplated that eight National Guard Divisions in New England and North Atlantic states would carry out heavy field artillery training here.)
4. The reservation was required for redeployment training of AGF units (i.e., ten coast artillery batteries would receive training to fire land targets; elements of both Army Air Force and naval air force would use the range facilities; and the reservation was an adjunct to Camp Pickett).

The AGF response went on to assure AGF that coordination was not a problem since, according to Army Regulation 210-10, "the post commander will be responsible for providing all units at this post with proportionate share of available and appropriate training facilities."

As you can see, A. P. Hill Military Reservation stayed very active until the war's end. Then, speculators began inquiring when the property would be available for purchase. But, the War Department had no immediate intention of declaring this training area as excess, for the reasons stated by AGF above. Their reply to the speculators was that they contemplated the continued utilization of the installation for an indefinite period.

VI. The Indefinite Period (After the War to the Present, Briefly).

In 1944, the average daily strength on the reservation began to drop and utilization fell off gradually to a very low level during 1947 through 1949. But, the 1950's brought a revitalization and improvements to the road system, firing ranges, campsites and airfield. On May 1, 1952, A. P. Hill Military Reservation became Camp A. P. Hill. Training was conducted the year round, a trend that has continued today.

In 1961, Second U. S. Army, under whose jurisdiction Camp A. P. Hill now fell, anticipated that combat divisions of the Reserve Components would train at the post thereafter. During 1962-63, a major expansion of the range complex occurred with the construction of electrical trainfire ranges, Army Training Test courses for crew-served weapons, and combat attack courses for squads and Platoons. Then, during the early Vietnam Era, more ranges were built; two 200-man classrooms were completed in 1966; and Anderson Camp was improved in 1967 with metal huts to house students from the Engineer Officer Basic Course and Officer Candidate School.

The 1970's were years for improvement and expansion of post facilities. On September 30, 1974, Camp Hill became Fort A. P. Hill, a recognition attesting to its importance and permanence. In fact, the first permanent-type campsite, The Old Guard Camp, was constructed in 1970. Logistical support was improved with the completion of a new ammunition supply point in 1971 and a direct/general support maintenance shop in 1972. A training site was built in 1973 to provide the advanced individual training (AIT) of engineer skills. Then in 1977, the new barracks and administrative offices for the Army Garrison were completed.

Construction and training continued throughout the 1980's. Fort A. P. Hill solidified its reputation as a leader in the continuing effort to
provide the Total Army, and other military services and government agencies, with the finest and most realistic field training possible. The Fort renewed its ties with the newly activated 29th Infantry Division (Light) by having the Second Brigade and the Light Infantry Training Detachment as tenants. Then, in 1990, Fort A. P. Hill came full circle in its history as a mobilization station when it began training and preparing Army Reserve and National Guard units for deployment to the Middle East as part of Operation Desert Shield.

The heartaches and adjustments have been many during the first half-century. Today, as well as in the grim days of 50 years ago, the fact remains that training for defense is not a nicety, but an imperative for all who value freedom, because freedom isn't free. Ambrose Powell Hill would be the first to agree.
1. Newspaper archives of the CAROLINE PROGRESS, the Fredericksburg FREE-LANCE STAR, and the Richmond TIMES-DISPATCH.


3. The National Archives, Record Group Numbers
   165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs
   337, Records of the Army Ground Forces
   338, Records of the First U. S. Army
   394, Records of the Third Corps Area and Third Service Command
   407, Records of the Adjutant General's Office

4. "Background to Historic Properties Survey," Theo M. Boland, Public Affairs Officer, Fort A. P. Hill, VA, 1975